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________________ 
 
OPINION  OF THE COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
A reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer informed the 
City of Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services in 
March 2018 that two of its agencies would not work with same-
sex couples as foster parents.  Human Services investigated 
this allegation, which it considered a violation of the City’s 
anti-discrimination laws.  When the agencies confirmed that, 
because of their religious views on marriage, they would not 
work with gay couples, Human Services ceased referring foster 
children to them.  One of those agencies, Catholic Social 
Services (sometimes abbreviated to “CSS”), brought this 
action claiming that the City has violated its rights under the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free 
Speech Clauses, as well as under Pennsylvania’s Religious 
Freedom Protection Act.  It seeks an order requiring the City 
to renew their contractual relationship while permitting it to 
turn away same-sex couples who wish to be foster parents.  
CSS sought preliminary injunctive relief to this effect from the 
District Court.  When it denied the request after a three-day 
hearing, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. 661 
(E.D. Pa. 2018), CSS appealed. 
Our question is not whether the City or CSS has 
behaved reasonably.  Nor is our task to mediate a mutually 
agreeable compromise between the parties.1  It is to determine 
                                              
1 That being said, District Judge Tucker commented that she 
“would prefer that the [p]arties seek . . . some compromise to 
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whether the City’s actions were lawful.  Did it have the 
authority to insist, consistent with the First Amendment and 
Pennsylvania law,that CSS not discriminate against same-sex 
couples as a condition of working with it to provide foster care 
services?  Or, inversely, has CSS demonstrated that the City 
transgressed fundamental guarantees of religious liberty? 
At this stage and on this record, we conclude that CSS 
is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.  The City’s non-
discrimination policy is a neutral, generally applicable law, and 
the religious views of CSS do not entitle it to an exception from 
that policy.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 
(1990).  It has failed to make a persuasive showing that the City 
targeted it for its religious beliefs, or is motivated by ill will 
against its religion, rather than sincere opposition to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Thus we 
affirm. 
I. Background 
Catholic Social Services is a religious non-profit 
organization affiliated with the Archdiocese of Philadelphia 
that provides foster care services in Philadelphia.  Created in 
1917 as the Catholic Children’s Bureau, it is part of a tradition 
of caring for children in need that stretches back even further, 
to the yellow fever outbreak of 1797.  As an affiliate of the 
Catholic Church, CSS sees caring for vulnerable children as a 
core value of the Christian faith and therefore views its foster 
care work as part of its religious mission and ministry.  When 
the Catholic Children’s Bureau was founded, foster care was 
handled on a private basis, but over the following century that 
changed.  Today that care is comprehensively regulated both 
                                              
their current dispute without court intervention.”  Id. at 667.  
We agree, especially given the long and constructive 
relationship between the parties.  
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by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and by the City of 
Philadelphia. 
The Commonwealth, the City, and the private foster 
care agencies each play a role in the Philadelphia foster care 
system.  State regulations set the criteria people or families 
must meet to become foster parents, as well as the duties of 
both foster parents and foster care agencies.  See 55 Pa. Code 
§ 3700.62 et seq.  Those agencies then develop relationships 
with individual foster families, which begin when a family 
approaches an agency seeking to become foster parents.  It 
must evaluate the applicants under the Commonwealth’s 
criteria to determine whether they would be suitable 
candidates.  See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6344(d); 55 Pa. Code 
§ 3700.64.  One criterion concerns the “[e]xisting family 
relationships, attitudes and expectations regarding the 
applicant’s own children and parent/child relationship, 
especially as they might affect a foster child.”  23 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 6344(d)(2)(iv); 55 Pa. Code § 3700.64(b)(1).   
When a child in need of foster care comes into the City’s 
custody, Human Services refers that child to one of the foster 
care agencies with which it has a contractual relationship.  
Once the City refers a child to an agency, that agency selects 
an appropriate foster parent for the child, although Human 
Services can oppose a child’s placement with a particular foster 
parent if necessary.   
At the outset of this litigation, the City of Philadelphia 
had contracts with 30 foster care agencies, including CSS.  
These are one-year contracts renewed on an annual basis.  
Agencies are compensated by the City for their services; CSS’s 
contract provided for a per diem rate for each child placed in 
one of its affiliated foster homes.  This payment did not cover 
its full expenses, meaning that CSS operated at a loss.  The 
contract required it to certify its foster parents in accord with 
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state regulations, but did not otherwise impose conditions on 
the certification process.  It did, however, include language 
prohibiting CSS from discriminating due to race, color, 
religion, or national origin, and it incorporated the City’s Fair 
Practices Ordinance, which in part prohibits sexual orientation 
discrimination in public accommodations. 
This last requirement, and the parties’ differing 
understandings of it, led to this controversy.  CSS takes the 
position that it cannot certify a same-sex married couple as 
foster parents consistent with its religious views.  As an 
affiliate of the Catholic Church, CSS adheres to the belief that 
marriage is between a man and a woman.  It is not unwilling to 
work with LGBTQ individuals as foster parents.  However, 
state regulations require it to consider an applicant’s “existing 
family relationships” as part of the certification process.  In 
applying this criterion, CSS will only certify foster parents who 
are either married or single; it will not certify cohabitating 
unmarried couples, and it considers all same-sex couples to be 
unmarried.  So far as the record reflects, no same-sex couples 
have approached CSS seeking to become foster parents. 
On March 9, 2018, a reporter from the Philadelphia 
Inquirer called Human Services and stated that two of the 
City’s foster care agencies, CSS and Bethany Christian 
Services, would not work with same-sex couples as foster 
parents.  The Inquirer published an article to this effect on 
March 13, 2018.  In response, the Commissioner of Human 
Services, Cynthia Figueroa, called officials at both CSS and 
Bethany Christian asking if this report was true.  Both 
organizations confirmed the report.  James Amato, the 
Secretary of CSS, told Commissioner Figueroa that his agency 
would not certify same-sex couples because it was against the 
Church’s views on marriage and, when told this was 
discrimination, replied that he was merely following the 
teachings of the Catholic Church.  Commissioner Figueroa 
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then called a number of other foster care agencies asking 
whether they had similar policies; none did.  All but one of the 
other agencies Figueroa called were religiously affiliated.  As 
for the one secular agency, she testified that she had a “good 
relationship” with its CEO.    
Shortly thereafter, Amato attended a meeting with 
Figueroa in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the impasse.  At 
this meeting, Amato invoked CSS’s hundred-year history of 
providing services to the City.  Figueroa responded by noting 
that times had changed over the course of that relationship, that 
women and African-Americans did not have the same rights 
when it started, and that she herself would likely not have been 
in her position a century earlier.  Figueroa, who is Catholic and 
Jesuit-educated, also remarked to Amato that it would be great 
if CSS could follow the teachings of Pope Francis.  Amato later 
testified that Figueroa specifically stated that CSS should 
follow Pope Francis as opposed to the Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia or its Archbishop Charles J. Chaput; Figueroa 
denied mentioning anyone other than Pope Francis.  Figueroa 
also indicated to Amato that the matter had the attention of the 
highest levels of City government, by which she testified she 
meant herself, her chain of command, and ultimately Mayor 
James Kenney.  She also testified that prior to this meeting she 
spoke briefly with the Mayor; she told him that she was 
working to address the issue and would brief him after more 
decisions had been made. 
Immediately after his meeting with Figueroa, Amato 
received a phone call from a representative of Human Services 
who informed him that it would no longer refer new foster 
children to CSS, a policy known as an “intake freeze.”2  
                                              
2 This intake freeze also affected Bethany Christian, although, 
as noted below, Bethany has since worked out an agreement 
with the City and has resumed receiving foster care referrals. 
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Figueroa testified that she implemented the freeze because of 
her serious concern that CSS’s relationship with Human 
Services might end in the near future.  Given the preference for 
stability in placing foster care children, she did not want to send 
any new children to an agency they might well have to leave in 
a matter of months.  This was not the first time Human Services 
had instituted an intake freeze out of a concern that it might not 
be able to continue working with a given agency.  The freeze 
nonetheless did not affect children already placed with CSS.   
Nor did it affect other aspects of CSS’s relationship with 
the City.  Family foster care is only one component of 
Philadelphia’s framework for at-risk children.  The City also 
employs private agencies to operate “congregate care” 
facilities, or group homes, for children in state custody who 
have not been assigned to a foster family for one reason or 
another.  And it partners with “Community Umbrella 
Agencies” that work with children in the community to address 
problems in their home environment that might prevent them 
from remaining at home.  CSS operates as a congregate care 
provider and a Community Umbrella Agency, and its services 
in those capacities were not affected by the intake freeze or any 
subsequent developments in this dispute pertaining to foster 
care.  Indeed, in each unrelated area it continues working with 
the City to this day. 
On several occasions Human Services granted 
exceptions to the intake freeze where there were particularly 
strong reasons why CSS would be the best placement for an 
individual child—for example, if one of that child’s siblings 
had already been placed with a CSS family.  It does not appear 
that any exemption requests were denied. 
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2018, two days after the 
Inquirer article, the City Council passed a resolution 
authorizing the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations 
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to “investigate Department of Human Services’ policies on 
contracting with social services agencies that . . . discriminate 
against prospective LGBTQ foster parents.”  The resolution 
stated that “the City of Philadelphia has laws in place to protect 
its people from discrimination that occurs under the guise of 
religious freedom,” and declared that any “agency which 
violates City contract rules in addition to the Fair Practices 
Ordinance should have their contract with the City terminated 
with all deliberate speed.”  The following day (March 16), 
lawyers for the Commission wrote to CSS with a battery of 
questions regarding its policies about working with same-sex 
couples or LGBTQ individuals.  It responded on April 16, 
2018, challenging both the legal basis for what it termed the 
“City’s unlawful suspension” of its contract and the 
Commission’s jurisdiction over the matter.  Centrally, CSS 
argued that its screening of would-be foster parents was not a 
public accommodation and hence not subject to the Fair 
Practices Ordinance. 
Lawyers from the City wrote back separately on the 
jurisdictional and substantive points on May 7, 2018.  As to 
substance, the City asserted that its contract with CSS had not 
been formally suspended, and that it did not require any 
referrals to that agency.  Therefore the City could not possibly 
have breached the contract by suspending referrals.  The letter 
noted several provisions of the contract that, it argued, forbade 
CSS’s policy of discrimination.   
After setting out the City’s legal interpretation of the 
contract, the letter stated its plan going forward: 
Please also note that CSS’s current contract 
expires on June 30, 2018, and the City is under 
no legal obligation to enter into a new contract 
for any period thereafter.  We are hopeful that we 
can work out any differences before then, but 
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please be advised that—except where the best 
interests of a child demands otherwise—the City 
does not plan to agree to any further referrals to 
CSS, and the City intends to assist with the 
transition of foster families to other agencies, 
absent assurances that CSS is prepared to adhere 
to its contractual obligations and, in 
implementing its City contract, to comply with 
all applicable laws, including those related to 
non-discrimination.  We believe our current 
contract with CSS is quite clear that this is our 
right, but please be advised that any further 
contracts with CSS will be explicit in this regard.   
The letter underscored “respect [for CSS’s] sincere 
religious beliefs, but your freedom to express them is not at 
issue here where you have chosen voluntarily to partner with 
us in providing government-funded, secular social services.”  
It stressed the importance of equality as “both a legal 
requirement, and an important City policy and value that must 
be embodied in our contractual relationships.”  In addition, the 
City reaffirmed that it did not want to see its “valuable 
relationship with CSS . . . come to an end,” but instead hoped 
that CSS would agree to comply going forward with the terms 
of the Fair Practices Ordinance.     
As to jurisdiction, the City further asserted that foster 
care is a public accommodation, triggering both the 
Ordinance’s mandate and the Commission’s jurisdiction.  The 
City requested a response to the questions in its March 16 letter 
within 10 days and threatened subpoenas if CSS did not 
comply.  The latter responded by filing this lawsuit, alleging 
16 causes of action against the City, Human Services, and the 
Human Relations Commission.  Three individuals who had 
worked with CSS as foster parents—Sharonell Fulton, Cecilia 
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Paul,3 and Toni Lynn Simms-Busch—were also listed as 
plaintiffs.4  On June 5, 2018, plaintiffs moved for a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction.  Their proposed 
order would have required the City to “resume providing foster 
care referrals to [CSS] and permitting children to be placed 
                                              
3 Ms. Paul died during the pendency of this action.  She 
fostered children for over 40 years, taking into her home more 
than 100 children, and personally adopting six.  In 2015, the 
City of Philadelphia recognized her as the “Outstanding Foster 
Parent of the Year.”  Thomas Paul, adopted son of Ms. Paul, 
“believes he was raised by a living saint.”  Brief of Amici 
Curiae Former Foster Children and Foster Parents and the 
Catholic Association Foundation at 4.  
 
4 We have doubts whether the individual plaintiffs have 
standing to bring this complaint, as the City took no direct 
action against them.  Any harms to the individual plaintiffs 
were the consequence of the City’s actions against CSS.  See 
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) (party seeking 
to assert the rights of others must show (1) a “close” 
relationship with the one who possesses the right, and (2) some 
“hindrance” to the possessor’s ability to assert its own rights).  
But the issue of standing was not raised, and the limits on third-
party standing are not a matter of our constitutional jurisdiction 
under Article III but rather “stem from a salutary ‘rule of self-
restraint.’”  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (quoting 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)).  In any event, 
the individual plaintiffs claim only that the City violated the 
Constitution by taking action against CSS.  Hence we may 
safely analyze this case solely in terms of whether CSS’s rights 
have been violated. 
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with the foster families it has certified without delay,” to 
“rescind its prior directive prohibiting any foster care referrals 
to [CSS,] . . . to resume all dealings with [it] on the same terms 
as they had proceeded prior to March 2018,” and also to 
“resume and to continue operating under the current Contract, 
without breach, termination, or expiration, or to enter into a 
new Contract identical in all material respects to the current 
Contract, while this matter remains pending.”  Doc. #13-1 to 
Fulton et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al., No. 2:18-cv-02075-
PBT (E.D. Pa. 2018).  (As noted below, that contractual 
arrangement has lapsed in any event.) 
The District Court promptly held a hearing on plaintiffs’ 
motion for preliminary injunctive relief.  The hearing, which 
spanned three days, included testimony from plaintiffs Simms-
Busch, Paul, and Fulton, as well as from Amato,5 Deputy 
Commissioner of Human Services Kimberly Ali, 
Commissioner Figueroa, and Frank Cervone, a child advocate 
                                              
5 At the hearing, Amato mentioned a CSS policy of which the 
City had been previously unaware, namely that CSS required 
would-be foster parents to submit a so-called “pastoral letter” 
from a religious figure (of any faith or denomination) 
certifying that they were actively religious, regularly attended 
services, etc.  The City took issue with this policy, arguing that 
it violated both CSS’s contract with the City and the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the federal 
Constitution.  CSS then informed the Court that, while it did 
not believe the “pastoral letter” requirement violated any 
applicable laws, it would abandon that requirement going 
forward “in order to eliminate any potential issue regarding 
how the parties would operate under a preliminary injunction.”   
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who testified as an expert witness.6  (It was after this hearing 
that lawyers for the City informed the Court that it had resumed 
foster care operations with Bethany Christian when the latter 
agreed to cease discriminating against same-sex couples.) 
The District Court denied the application for 
preliminary injunctive relief in a memorandum opinion, and 
plaintiffs appealed the same day.  They argue to us that the 
District Court wrongly held that they were not likely to succeed 
on the merits of their Free Exercise, Establishment Clause, and 
Freedom-of-Speech claims, as well as under the Pennsylvania 
Religious Freedom Protection Act.  Plaintiffs asked the District 
Court for injunctive relief pending appeal the following day, 
which it denied.   
Plaintiffs—now appellants—also sought from our 
Court emergency injunctive relief pending appeal under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.  We denied the motion 
by order.   
Finally, appellants filed an emergency application to the 
Supreme Court for an injunction pending appeal or an 
immediate grant of certiorari.  Justice Alito referred the 
application to the full Court, which denied it.  Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 18A-118, 2018 WL 4139298 (U.S. Aug. 30, 
2018). 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
                                              
6 Plaintiffs contested the propriety of Cervone’s testimony, as 
he had signed legal papers in the case on behalf of the Center 
for Child Advocates, an organization seeking to intervene in 
the case (ultimately successfully), and Cervone had not yet 
withdrawn that appearance. In any event his testimony is not 
important to the issues on appeal. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  Our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial 
of a preliminary injunction stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
Ordinarily, when reviewing a district court’s ruling on 
a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, we review findings 
of fact for clear error, conclusions of law de novo, and the 
ultimate decision to grant or deny preliminary relief for abuse 
of discretion.  Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 
(3d Cir. 2017).  Because this case implicates First Amendment 
interests, however, we do not rely on the normal clear-error 
standard for factual review, but instead conduct an independent 
examination of the record as a whole.  Brown v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus we 
defer to the District Court’s factual findings only insofar as 
they concern witness credibility.  Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2002). 
When evaluating a motion for preliminary injunctive 
relief, a court considers four factors: (1) has the moving party 
established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 
(which need not be more likely than not); (2) is the movant 
more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 
of preliminary relief; (3) does the balance of equities tip in its 
favor; and (4) is an injunction in the public interest?  Winter v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Reilly, 
858 F.3d at 179.  If a plaintiff meets the first two requirements, 
the District Court determines in its sound discretion whether 
all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the 
relief sought.  Id. 
III. Discussion 
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
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CSS principally contends that the City’s actions 
violated its rights under the Free Exercise Clause.  The First 
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”  This prohibition applies to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  Per Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), the Free Exercise 
Clause “means, first and foremost, the right to believe and 
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”  
Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes 
all governmental regulation of religious beliefs 
as such.  The government may not compel 
affirmation of religious belief, punish the 
expression of doctrines it believes to be false, 
impose special disabilities on the basis of 
religious views of religious status, or lend its 
power to one or the other side in controversies 
over religious authority or dogma.  
Id. (internal citations and question marks omitted) (emphasis 
in original).  Likewise, it forbids government acts specifically 
designed to suppress religiously motivated practices or 
conduct.  Id. at 877–78. 
The Free Exercise Clause does not, however, “relieve 
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes 
(or proscribes).’”  Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment)).  As Justice Felix Frankfurter stated nearly eighty 
years ago, “[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of 
the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the 
individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the 
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promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”  Id. at 879 
(quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.)).  Among other 
things, this means that religious or conscientious objections do 
not supersede the basic obligation to comply with generally 
applicable civil rights laws provided those laws are applied 
neutrally.  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Com’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (“Nevertheless, 
while . . . religious and philosophical objections [to same-sex 
marriage] are protected, it is a general rule that such objections 
do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy 
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods 
and services under a neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations law.”); see also Christian Legal Soc'y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 694 n.24 (2010) (observing that, under 
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause did not require public law 
school to grant religious exemption to its “all-comers” policy 
forbidding discrimination by student organizations).  
CSS contends that the City’s enforcement of its laws 
and policies was neither neutral nor generally applicable.  It 
first argues that the City’s reliance on the Fair Practices 
Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in public accommodations, is misplaced 
because evaluating prospective foster parents is not a public 
accommodation.7  The District Court disagreed and held that 
                                              
7 CSS makes a similar argument toward what it calls the City’s 
“must-certify” policy, which it claims was the second basis for 
the City’s actions in addition to the Fair Practices Ordinance.  
CSS asserts that the City had never enforced such a policy 
before this dispute.  The City, meanwhile, disclaims the 
policy’s existence, and says that it was solely enforcing its 
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the Ordinance did apply to CSS.  We need not address this 
issue, however, as the contract between CSS and the City 
expired on June 30, 2018.  As a result, requiring the City to 
comply with the terms of that agreement is now moot.  What 
remains is whether it may insist on the inclusion of new, 
explicit language forbidding discrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation as a condition of contract renewal, or 
whether it must offer CSS a new contract that allows it to 
continue engaging in its current course of conduct.8  
To support its claim that the City’s proposed anti-
discrimination clause is not permissible under Smith, CSS 
invokes cases where courts have found ostensibly neutral 
                                              
longstanding rules against discrimination.  But as noted above, 
because the existing contract between CSS and the City has 
expired, we need not address whether any “must-certify” 
policy was a sufficiently neutral, general rule to support the 
City’s actions.  (See below for a fuller discussion of the dispute 
over the “must-certify” policy as it relates to the City’s 
motivation.) 
8 It should be noted that the remedy CSS seeks—an injunction 
forcing the City to renew a public services contract with a 
particular private party—would be highly unusual.  CSS cites 
several affirmative action cases where courts granted equitable 
relief to government contractors, such as Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  But the 
injunctions in those cases merely forbade government entities 
from enforcing their express affirmative action policies going 
forward.  See id. at 210.  We have some doubt, therefore, that 
CSS could be entitled to the relief it seeks.  We do not rest our 
decision on that ground, however, as it involves novel and 
complex questions of remedies law, and instead address the 
merits of CSS’s claims. 
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government action unconstitutional because it was motivated 
by ill will toward a specific religious group or otherwise 
impermissibly targeted religious conduct.  See, e.g., 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
These cases, and similar decisions by our Court, clarify Smith 
by reaffirming that the government may not conceal an 
impermissible attack on religion behind a cloak of neutrality 
and general application.  Thus, a challenger under the Free 
Exercise Clause must show that it was treated differently 
because of its religion.  Put another way, it must show that it 
was treated more harshly than the government would have 
treated someone who engaged in the same conduct but held 
different religious views. 
The focus on different treatment of religious and secular 
conduct is clear in Lukumi, the font of this doctrine.  There the 
City of Hialeah, Florida had adopted an ordinance prohibiting 
the slaughtering of animals except in certain recognized 
circumstances.  The history of the law’s adoption made plain, 
however, that this was no earnest piece of animal welfare 
legislation but rather an attempt to suppress the practice of 
Santeria, a fusion of traditional African religion and 
Catholicism that developed in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century 
and incorporates animal sacrifice in many of its rituals.  
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524.  The emergency sessions that led to 
the ordinance, held immediately after a Santeria church first 
tried to open in town, were rife with unrestrained hostility.  
Council members referred to supposed Biblical prohibitions on 
animal sacrifice except for consumption and asked “What can 
we do to prevent the Church from opening?”  Id. at 541.  The 
audience cheered these remarks and taunted the president of 
the Church, plus the chaplain of the city police department 
called Santeria “an abomination to the Lord.” Id. at 541–42. 
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Moreover, the ordinance itself, though ostensibly 
concerned with animal welfare, plainly reflected this hostility.  
Its restriction on animal killing was limited to “sacrifice,” and 
was further limited to the context of “a public or private ritual 
or ceremony.”  Id. at 527.  Although it did not apply if the 
killing was “for the primary purpose of food consumption,” or 
if the animals were “specifically raised for food purposes,” the 
ordinance did apply to ritual sacrifice even if the animal was 
eaten during the ritual, as would often happen in Santeria 
rituals.  Id. at 527–28.  As the Court noted, the “net result” of 
these definitions was that “few if any killings of animals are 
proscribed other than Santeria sacrifice. . . . Indeed, careful 
drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, 
killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all 
other circumstances are unpunished.”  Id. at 536.  This 
“gerrymander” of the ordinance, id., along with the striking 
hostility at the public meetings, left the Court with only “one 
conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression 
of religion.”  Id. at 542. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop featured similar demonstrations 
of religious animosity and differing treatment of religious 
conduct.9  Denver baker Jack Phillips refused to make a cake 
for a gay couple’s wedding reception, citing his religious 
conviction that marriage is only the union of a man and a 
woman.  Phillips believed that, were he “to create a wedding 
cake for an event that celebrates something that directly goes 
against the teachings of the Bible, [it] would have been a 
personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and 
relationship that they were entering into.”  Masterpiece 
                                              
9 Unlike Lukumi, where the impermissible hostility toward 
Santeria was apparent during the adoption of the animal 
sacrifice ordinance, in Masterpiece it came out in the conduct 
of the officials charged with executing the law. 
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Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.  The couple sued under 
Colorado’s public accommodations statute.  The case was 
referred to the state’s Civil Rights Commission, which 
concluded that Phillips had engaged in prohibited 
discrimination and that neither Phillips’s religious free exercise 
nor his free speech rights were violated by applying this anti-
discrimination law to him.  
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed; while 
Colorado generally had the right to enforce its civil rights laws 
against Phillips, it was bound under the First Amendment to 
afford him a “neutral and respectful consideration.”  Id. at 
1729.  Instead, the Commission expressed open hostility 
toward Phillips and his religion and treated him differently 
from others similarly situated because of that religion.  The 
Court noted ambiguous expressions from commissioners that 
could be taken either as reflecting resentment toward Phillips’s 
religious views or simply the uncontroversial principle that “a 
business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual 
orientation, regardless of” those views.  Id.  (“One 
commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe ‘what he 
wants to believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he 
decides to do business in the state.’ A few moments later, the 
commissioner restated the same position: ‘If a businessman 
wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with 
the—the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs 
to look at being able to compromise.’”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
These ambiguous statements were more sinister, 
however, in the context of another commissioner’s naked 
hostility toward religion. 
Freedom of religion and religion ha[ve] been 
used to justify all kinds of discrimination 
throughout history, whether it be slavery, 
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whether it be the Holocaust, whether it be—I 
mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations 
where freedom of religion has been used to 
justify discrimination.  And to me it is one of the 
most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people 
can use to—to use their religion to hurt others. 
Id.  This, the Court noted, disparaged Phillips’s religion “in at 
least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also 
by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something 
insubstantial and even insincere.”  Id.  By calling religion the 
“most despicable” way to justify hurting others, the comment 
also suggested that the commissioner thought Phillips’s actions 
were worse specifically because of their religious character.   
The inference that Phillips was treated worse because of 
his religion was bolstered by the Commission’s different 
treatment of other bakers who refused to bake cakes bearing 
homophobic expressions.  The state Civil Rights Division 
found that these actions did not violate the state’s civil rights 
laws because the requested message was offensive in nature.  
Id. at 1730–31.  Thus it appeared that the state had “treated the 
other bakers’ conscience-based objections as legitimate, but 
[Phillips’s] as illegitimate—thus sitting in judgment of his 
religious beliefs themselves.”  Id. at 1730. 
Our Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in the 
wake of Smith and Lukumi likewise asks whether challengers 
have been treated worse than others who engaged in similar 
conduct because of their religious character.  For example, in 
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of 
Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999), we held unconstitutional 
the Newark Police Department’s policy that officers could not 
have facial hair.  The Department had granted exceptions to 
this policy due to medical need, but would not grant similar 
exceptions to Sunni Muslims whose religion forbade them to 
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shave their beards.  Id. at 360.  This was “sufficiently 
suggestive of discriminatory intent . . . to trigger heightened 
scrutiny[,]” id. at 365, which the policy could not survive. 
Similarly in Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of 
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002), the Borough of Tenafly 
had on its books an ordinance prohibiting the affixing of “any 
sign or advertisement, or other matter upon,” among other 
things, telephone poles.  Id. at 151.  In practice, this ordinance 
was almost never enforced, and it was common to see house 
number signs, lost animal signs, commemorative ribbons, 
holiday displays, wreaths, and various other fixtures on the 
town’s telephone poles.  But when Orthodox Jewish residents 
sought to erect an eruv by placing lechis on utility poles,10 the 
Borough refused to grant them a similar exemption and sought 
to enforce the ordinance.  We held that the Borough thereby 
violated the Free Exercise Clause.  Although the ordinance 
itself was general and neutral, such that Smith might apply, it 
had not been enforced evenhandedly.  Instead, the Borough had 
an apparent practice of granting ad hoc exceptions but refused 
to make one for the Orthodox Jews’ religious practice.  This 
system of discretionary exemptions called for strict scrutiny 
(meaning they must be justified by a compelling government 
interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling 
interest), and the Borough’s actions could not survive. 
                                              
10 An eruv is a ceremonially created space outside of the home 
wherein Orthodox Jews may engage in the otherwise 
proscribed activities of pushing and carrying objects on the 
Sabbath.  This can be done by placing lechis, thin black strips 
made of hard plastic and nearly identical to the coverings on 
ordinary ground wires, on utility poles to mark the boundaries 
of the eruv.  309 F.3d at 152. 
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These cases have in common that religiously motivated 
conduct was treated worse than otherwise similar conduct with 
secular motives.  The ordinance in Lukumi was pretzeled to 
prohibit only Santeria ritual sacrifices and no other animal 
killings, even those no more humane or necessary.  In 
Fraternal Order of Police the City of Newark granted 
exemptions to its facial hair policy for medical reasons but not 
for religious ones.  In Tenafly an ordinance virtually never 
enforced was exacted exclusively on the religious practice of 
Orthodox Jews.  And in Masterpiece the comments of 
Commission members, along with the disparate treatment of 
other bakers’ secular claims of conscience, raised suspicion 
that Phillips had been treated more harshly because the 
Commission found his religious views offensive. 
The question in our case, then, is whether CSS was 
treated differently because of its religious beliefs.  Put another 
way, was the City appropriately neutral, or did it treat CSS 
worse than it would have treated another organization that did 
not work with same-sex couples as foster parents but had 
different religious beliefs?  Based on the record before us, that 
question has a clear answer: no.   The City has acted only to 
enforce its non-discrimination policy in the face of what it 
considers a clear violation. 
As evidence that the City acted out of religious hostility, 
CSS first points to the City Council’s resolution authorizing 
the Commission on Human Relations’ inquiry, which stated 
that “Philadelphia has laws in place to protect its people from 
discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious 
freedom.”  But this comment falls into the grey zone identified 
by the Supreme Court in Masterpiece—a remark that could 
express contempt for religion or could merely state the well-
established legal principle that religious belief will not excuse 
compliance with general civil rights laws.  Unlike the 
commissioner in Masterpiece who suggested that religious 
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justifications for discrimination are merely rhetorical, here 
City officials repeatedly emphasized that they respected CSS’s 
beliefs as sincere and deeply held.  The Commission’s May 7, 
2018 letter, for instance, stated that “[w]e respect your sincere 
religious beliefs, but your freedom to express them is not at 
issue here where you have chosen voluntarily to partner with 
us in providing government-funded, secular social services.”  
This is the kind of respectful consideration found lacking in 
Masterpiece, and nowhere in the record did the City depart 
from this respectful posture. 
CSS next points to Commissioner Figueroa’s 
statements during her meeting with Amato that “it would be 
great if we could follow the teachings of Pope Francis.”  Taken 
out of context, some might think this remark improper, as it has 
clear religious overtones.  But context is important: the 
comment was made during a negotiation attempting to find a 
mutually agreeable solution to this controversy.  In that light, 
Figueroa’s statement is best viewed as an effort to reach 
common ground with Amato by appealing to an authority 
within their shared religious tradition.  The First Amendment 
does not prohibit government officials working with religious 
organizations in this kind of partnership from speaking those 
organizations’ language and making arguments they may find 
compelling from within their own faith’s perspective.  And 
though these attempts to persuade CSS were ultimately 
unsuccessful, the record does not suggest that the City then 
sought to punish it for this disagreement. 
CSS also argues that Commissioner Figueroa’s decision 
to call mostly religious foster care agencies to ask if they had a 
similar policy is evidence that the City impermissibly targeted 
religion.  But focusing her inquiries on religious agencies made 
sense: the only agencies Figueroa knew that refused to work 
with same-sex couples—CSS and Bethany Christian—did so 
for religious reasons.  She had little reason to think that 
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nonreligious agencies might have a similar policy.  In fact, no 
other religious agency besides the two mentioned by the 
reporter had this policy, and Figueroa did call one secular 
agency as well.   
Finally, CSS points to several public statements (the 
most recent of which occurred in 2015) made by Mayor 
Kenney critical of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia and of 
Archbishop Chaput.  No doubt the Mayor expressed concerns 
toward the local Catholic Church, with a particular focus on 
the Church’s stance on gay rights.  But CSS’s claim that he 
“prompted” Human Services’ 2018 inquiry in this case 
misstates the record.  Figueroa testified that she discussed the 
issue with the Mayor prior to meeting with Amato and told the 
Mayor she would brief him once a decision had been made.  
There is nothing in the record before us suggesting that he 
played a direct role, or even a significant role, in the process.   
The evidence CSS offers of religious bias or hostility 
appears significantly less than what was present in Lukumi or 
even in Masterpiece.  Nor is there much to suggest that the City 
treated CSS differently because of its religion.  It argues that it 
has been subject to selective enforcement, akin to that in 
Tenafly and Fraternal Order of Police, because the City 
adopted what CSS sees as novel legal arguments invented 
during this controversy to justify its actions against CSS.  First, 
it claims that the City had never previously taken the position 
that the Fair Practices Ordinance applies to the screening of 
foster parents.  But nothing before us suggests that the City 
took this position disingenuously or as a pretext for persecuting 
CSS.  Its interpretation of the Ordinance, with which the 
District Court agreed, was hardly frivolous.  Nor is it 
suspicious that the City had never previously taken this 
position: the record contains no evidence of any foster care 
agencies discriminating in ways that would violate the Fair 
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Practices Ordinance prior to this controversy.  The issue simply 
seems not to have come up previously.   
Second, CSS argues that the City created what CSS 
calls a “must-certify policy” as a justification for the actions 
against it.  The City’s position, according to CSS, is that foster 
agencies must at least evaluate any applicants who come to 
them seeking to become foster parents rather than referring 
them to a different agency—although agencies would retain 
their discretion whether to certify an applicant as fit after 
evaluation.  CSS perceives that the City would object to any 
referral, and it argues that this was a novel position adopted 
during this controversy.  Amato testified that referrals from one 
agency to another are a routine way of finding the best fit for a 
given applicant.  But the record here is unclear, both as to the 
City’s current position and as to its policy prior to this case.  
The former is not necessarily an objection to any referrals at all 
so much as an objection to referrals made for an improper 
basis, i.e,. that the referring agency refuses to work with 
members of a protected class.  As to the latter, the referrals 
Amato described may have only involved an agency 
suggesting that a family might prefer a different agency rather 
than refusing to work with a particular applicant outright.  It 
would be consistent for the City to insist that, while agencies 
are free to inform applicants if they believe a different agency 
would be a better fit, they must leave the ultimate decision up 
to the applicants.  In any case, this dispute does not indicate 
improper religious hostility on the City’s part, only a routine 
regulatory disagreement. 
Third, CSS argues that the City has acted inconsistently 
because Human Services will consider factors such as race or 
disability when placing foster children with foster parents.  But 
there are many differences between CSS’s behavior and the 
City’s consideration of race or disability when placing a foster 
child.  Most significantly, unlike CSS, Human Services never 
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refuses to work with individuals because of their membership 
in a protected class.  Instead it seeks to find the best fit for each 
child, taking the whole of that child’s life and circumstances 
into account.11  And there is no instance in the record of Human 
Services knowingly permitting any other foster agency to 
discriminate against members of a protected class. 
In sum, at the preliminary injunction stage CSS shows 
insufficient evidence that the City violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.  The Fair Practices Ordinance has not been 
gerrymandered as in Lukumi, and there is no history of ignoring 
widespread secular violations as in Tenafly or the kind of 
animosity against religion found in Masterpiece.  Here the City 
has been working with CSS for many decades fully aware of 
its religious character.  It continues to work with CSS as a 
congregate care provider and as a Community Umbrella 
Agency even to this day despite CSS’s religious views 
regarding marriage.  And the City has expressed a constant 
desire to renew its relationship with CSS as a foster care 
agency if it will comply with the City’s non-discrimination 
policies protecting same-sex couples. 
CSS sees the City’s non-discrimination policy as a 
pretext to exclude it from public life because of its religious 
character, and invokes Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia 
v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), in which the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional rules excluding religious organizations 
                                              
11 The issue of race in foster care and adoption is notoriously 
thorny and complex, and is the subject of considerable 
scholarly literature.  See, e.g., PACT: An Adoption Alliance, 
Biracial, Multiracial, Interracial Identity in Adoption 
(accessed March 11, 2019), 
http://www.pactadopt.org/resources/biracial-multiracial-
adoption-identity.html (collecting scholarly articles).   
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from a public grant program.  CSS’s counsel at oral argument 
described the proposed contract language expressly forbidding 
discrimination on the basis of orientation as a “poison pill.”  Tr. 
of Oral Arg. at 61.  CSS likewise states in its brief that “[t]he 
City thus proposes to change its foster care contract 
specifically to prohibit [CSS’s] religious exercise.” 
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3.  But it can point to no specific 
evidence demonstrating that the City acted other than out of a 
sincere commitment to equality and non-discrimination.   
CSS’s theme devolves to this: the City is targeting CSS 
because it discriminates against same-sex couples; CSS is 
discriminating against same-sex couples because of its 
religious beliefs; therefore the City is targeting CSS for its 
religious beliefs.  But this syllogism is as flawed as it is 
dangerous.   It runs directly counter to the premise of Smith 
that, while religious belief is always protected, religiously 
motivated conduct enjoys no special protections or exemption 
from general, neutrally applied legal requirements.  That CSS’s 
conduct springs from sincerely held and strongly felt religious 
beliefs does not imply that the City’s desire to regulate that 
conduct springs from antipathy to those beliefs.  If all comment 
on religiously motivated conduct by those enforcing neutral, 
generally applicable laws against discrimination is construed 
as ill will against the religious belief itself, then Smith is a dead 
letter, and the nation’s civil rights laws might be as well.  As 
the Intervenors rightly state, the “fact that CSS’s non-
compliance with the City’s non-discrimination requirements is 
based on its religious beliefs does not mean that the City’s 
enforcement of its requirements constitutes anti-religious 
hostility.”  Intervenor’s Br. at 22.   
We thus believe the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that CSS has failed to demonstrate a 
sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of its Free 
Exercise Clause claim. 
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B. The Establishment Clause  
CSS argues that the City’s actions violated not only the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause but also its 
Establishment Clause.  “The clearest command of 
the . . . [Establishment] Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”  
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).  In this case, the 
two Religion Clauses largely run together: insofar as CSS 
alleges that it has been blacklisted for its religious beliefs, it is 
alleging both a Free Exercise violation (persecution for its 
religious views) and an Establishment Clause violation (the 
City declaring some religious viewpoints favored and others 
disfavored).  
Insofar as the Establishment claim here is analytically 
independent of the Free Exercise claim, CSS contends the City 
has dictated its preferred religious viewpoint—that religious 
institutions should recognize the marriage of same-sex 
couples—and has conditioned CSS’s future contract on 
adherence to that perspective.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (prayer at public high school graduation 
violated the First Amendment, in part because the government 
not only chose the clergyman but imposed guidelines on the 
composition of his prayer).  To support this claim it focuses 
primarily on Commissioner Figueroa’s statement in her 
meeting with Amato that “it would be great if we could follow 
the teachings of Pope Francis.”  CSS sees this as the City 
telling it which religious leaders to follow and how to interpret 
their teachings, and then “punishing” it when it refused to 
comply.  See Appellant’s Br. at 38–40.   
If the City truly were punishing CSS for refusing to 
adopt its preferred view of Catholic teaching, no doubt that 
would be an impermissible establishment of religion.  But that 
is not what happened here.  Human Services still works with 
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CSS as a congregate care provider and a Community Umbrella 
Agency.  It still works with Bethany Christian as a foster care 
agency, even though Bethany also maintains its religious 
opposition to same-sex marriage.  This supports the view that 
CSS is not being excluded due to its religious beliefs.  Indeed, 
the City has maintained its other relationships with CSS and 
has merely insisted that, if CSS wants to continue providing 
foster care, it must abide by the City’s non-discrimination 
policy in doing so.  There is simply no evidence that this is a 
veiled attempt to coerce or impose certain religious beliefs on 
CSS.   
The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that CSS has not shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its Establishment Clause claim. 
C. Freedom of Speech 
In addition to its claims under the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses, CSS also claims that the City has violated its 
freedom-of-speech rights in two different ways: by compelling 
it to speak in ways it finds disagreeable and by retaliating 
against it for engaging in protected speech. 
i. Compelled Speech  
For over 70 years it has been axiomatic that the Free 
Speech Clause also protects the right not to speak.  See W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (“To sustain 
the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of 
Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own 
mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter 
what is not in his mind.”).  CSS claims it has been compelled 
to speak because Pennsylvania law imposes a requirement that, 
after evaluating prospective foster parents, an agency must 
“give written notice to foster families of its decision to 
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approve, disapprove or provisionally approve the foster 
family.”  55 Pa. Code § 3700.69.  Because the City forbids CSS 
from finding an applicant unqualified for a “discriminatory 
reason,” including their sexual orientation or same-sex 
relationship, it is therefore forcing CSS “to make written 
endorsements that violate its sincere religious beliefs.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 53.   
The problem with this argument is that the ostensibly 
compelled speech occurs in the context of CSS’s performance 
of a public service pursuant to a contract with the government.  
In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Supreme Court 
upheld conditions on government grants under Title X of the 
Public Health Service Act preventing grant programs from 
providing to their patients not only abortion services but also 
counseling or information about abortion.  Id. at 193–200.  The 
Court held that this was not an impermissible restriction on 
speech or viewpoint discrimination because the government is 
free to fund only those programs that comport with its own 
view on matters such as abortion.   
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for 
Open Society International, 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (“AOSI”), 
clarified this rule by holding that, while the government may 
place conditions on the use of public grant monies, it may not 
require grant recipients to adopt the government’s views as 
their own.  Thus, the requirement that organizations receiving 
money to combat HIV/AIDS not use that money “to promote 
or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex 
trafficking,” 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e), was acceptable under Rust. 
But the rule that no funds could be used by any organization 
“that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution 
and sex trafficking,” id. § 7631(f) (emphasis added), 
unconstitutionally compelled speech.  It did not simply tell 
grant recipients how to use the government’s money, but 
required them to affirm their own agreement with the 
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government’s policy—not unlike the requirement in Barnette 
that schoolchildren recite the Pledge of Allegiance. 
CSS argues that it has been required to adopt the City’s 
views about same-sex marriage and to affirm these views in its 
evaluations of prospective foster parents, and that this violates 
the rule of AOSI.  It contends that the speech in question is 
beyond the scope of its contract with the City because the 
requirement of performing evaluations comes from state law 
rather than from the contract itself, and because the 
compensation formula in the contract is not tied to the number 
of evaluations performed.  We disagree.  The speech here only 
occurs because CSS has chosen to partner with the government 
to help provide what is essentially a public service.  The exact 
allocation of responsibility between the Commonwealth and 
the City, or the funding structure in the contract, does not 
change that.  Neither Rust nor AOSI, nor any other relevant 
precedent, focused on the precise funding structure of the 
government contracts at issue.  Instead, the cases focus on 
whether the condition pertains to the program receiving 
government money, as the City’s non-discrimination 
requirements do here.   
The City would violate AOSI if it refused to contract 
with CSS unless it officially proclaimed its support for same-
sex marriage.  But to the contrary, the City is willing to work 
with organizations that do not approve of gay marriage, as its 
continued relationship with Bethany Christian, its continued 
relationship with CSS in its other capacities, and its willingness 
to resume working with CSS as a foster care agency attest.  It 
simply insists that CSS abide by public rules of non-
discrimination in the performance of its public function under 
any foster-care contract.  Therefore CSS’s compelled speech 
claim does not at this time have a reasonable likelihood of 
success, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
so holding. 
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ii. Speech Retaliation 
To prevail on a speech retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 
show that it engaged in constitutionally protected activity, that 
the government responded with retaliation, and that the 
protected activity caused the retaliation.  See Eichenlaub v. 
Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).  This 
rule is a straightforward application of the First Amendment’s 
basic command that the government may not punish those who 
utter protected speech.  Where the plaintiff is a government 
employee, additional considerations come into play, and the 
plaintiff’s speech is only protected if it occurred in his or her 
capacity as a citizen rather than as a public employee.  See 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).     
CSS argues that it provides foster care services as a 
religious ministry protected by the First Amendment and that 
it “engages in protected speech when it evaluates families” as 
potential foster parents.  Id.  It also asserts retaliation against it 
for statements made to the Inquirer, and for its subsequent 
statements to Human Services confirming that it would not 
work with same-sex couples as foster parents. 
This claim is unlikely to succeed because the City’s 
actions were regulatory rather than retaliatory in nature.  The 
speech retaliation doctrine is implicated where the government 
has taken some action against an individual ostensibly 
unrelated to that individual’s protected speech yet motivated 
by a desire to retaliate.   See, e.g., Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 282–
85 (approving retaliation claim alleging that the Township 
denied building permit applications to punish a landowner’s 
speech at a public meeting).  Here, on the contrary, the City has 
directly regulated the very conduct CSS claims is 
constitutionally protected: its refusal to evaluate or work with 
same-sex couples.  Thus the City has “retaliated” against CSS 
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only in the same way enforcement of any government 
regulation “retaliates” against those who violate it.   
Insofar as CSS claims it was subject to retaliation for its 
statements to the Inquirer and to Human Services confirming 
that it engages in the discriminatory conduct to which the City 
objects, this too cannot support a valid retaliation claim.  We 
do not read the City’s actions as punishing CSS for those 
statements rather than for the discriminatory conduct itself.  
Once again, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that CSS has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood 
of success on its speech retaliation claim. 
D. The Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Protection Act 
CSS’s final claim is under the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act (RFPA), 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2401 et 
seq.  Similar in some ways to the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., the RFPA 
generally provides that “an agency shall not substantially 
burden a person’s free exercise of religion, including any 
burden which results from a rule of general applicability.” It 
may do so, however, if it proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the burden both is “(1) [i]n furtherance of a 
compelling interest of the agency” and is “(2) [t]he least 
restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest.”  71 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 2404.  “Substantially burden” is defined as an 
action that does any of the following:  
(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or 
expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs[;]   
(2) Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express 
adherence to the person’s religious faith[;]   
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(3) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage 
in activities which are fundamental to the person’s 
religion[;]   
(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates a 
specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.   
 
Id. § 2403.  CSS argues that all four forms of substantial burden 
exist here.  Its argument as to each prong ultimately rests on 
this: CSS’s foster care work is part of its religious ministry, its 
religious convictions prevent it from “endorsing” same-sex 
marriage, and under the City’s policies it may not engage in its 
foster care ministry while abiding by its convictions.  Thus, 
CSS must choose either endorsing a viewpoint that violates the 
tenets of its faith or ceasing its religious ministry of providing 
foster care. 
Pennsylvania courts applying the RFPA scrutinize 
claims of religious burden to see whether the burdened activity 
is truly “fundamental to the person’s religion.”  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Parente, 956 A.2d 1065, 1074 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2008) (“Parente never testified that his 
activities . . . constitute ‘activities which are fundamental to 
his religion’ . . . . Rather, at best, Parente’s testimony merely 
establishes that he engaged in these activities based upon his 
religious beliefs or that they flowed from a religious 
mission.”). 12   
                                              
12 This is different than the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and Supreme Court jurisprudence, which does 
not delve into investigating a person’s religious beliefs.  See, 
e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 
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In Ridley Park United Methodist Church v. Zoning 
Hearing Board Ridley Park Borough, 920 A.2d 953 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2007), for instance, the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court held that a church was not entitled to a 
RFPA exemption from a local zoning code in order to operate 
a daycare center on its property.  While the daycare center 
“aided in carrying out the Church’s religious mission,” it was 
not a “fundamental religious activity of a church.”  Id. at 960.  
By analogy, “ministering to the sick can flow from a religious 
mission, but it is not a fundamental religious activity of a 
church because a hospital may be built to satisfy that mission.”  
Id.  Thus it appears that Pennsylvania courts consider an 
activity “fundamental to a person’s religion” if it is an 
inherently religious activity as opposed to something that could 
be done either by a religious person or group or by a secular 
one.  The parallel here is direct: caring for vulnerable children 
can flow from a religious mission, but it is not an intrinsically 
religious activity under Pennsylvania law.   
It thus seems unlikely that the Pennsylvania courts 
would recognize a substantial burden on CSS’s exercise of 
religion in this case.  We have noted before, however, that this 
facet of RFPA jurisprudence “appears to create some tension 
between state and federal law,” as the “Supreme Court has 
cautioned against making religious interpretations in the First 
Amendment context.”  Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 
F.3d 231, 258 (3d Cir. 2008) (Scirica, J., concurring); see also 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87 (“It is no more appropriate for 
judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious beliefs . . . in 
                                              
(2014) (“Arrogating the authority to provide a binding national 
answer to this religious and philosophical question, HHS and 
the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs 
are flawed.  For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to 
take such a step.”). 
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the free exercise field . . . than it would be for them to 
determine the ‘importance’ of ideas . . . in the free speech 
field.”).   
Thus we make clear that even if we were to assume 
there is a substantial burden here, CSS is not likely to prevail 
on its RFPA claim because the City’s actions are the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling government 
interest.  It is black-letter law that “eradicating discrimination” 
is a compelling interest.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 623 (1984).  And mandating compliance is the least 
restrictive means of pursuing that interest.  See Hobby Lobby, 
573 U.S. at 733 (“The Government has a compelling interest 
in providing equal opportunity to participate in the workforce 
without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial 
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical 
goal.”); see also E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 594 (6th Cir. 2018) (denying 
several alternative means of enforcing the government’s 
interest in preventing discrimination against transgender 
employee in favor of simply enforcing the ban on that 
discrimination).13   
                                              
13 Note that this “strict scrutiny” test under RFPA is different 
from the strict scrutiny that would apply under Lukumi, 
Fraternal Order of Police, and Tenafly if Catholic Social 
Services were able to demonstrate religious targeting or 
enforcement disparities.  In the latter case, we would examine 
not the general interest behind the City’s anti-discrimination 
laws but the specific interest in the different enforcement of 
those laws against religious and secular groups.  See Tenafly, 
309 F.3d at 172 (applying strict scrutiny to the Town’s 
justifications for treating lechis differently from those 
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CSS offers several reasons why the City has no 
compelling interest in enforcing the Fair Practices Ordinance 
here.  First, it asserts that evaluating potential foster parents is 
not a public accommodation.  Second, it calls the harm the City 
seeks to prevent speculative, citing Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786, 799–800 (2011), for the 
principle that “ambiguous proof” of speculative harms will not 
suffice to provide a compelling interest.  Finally, it argues that 
the City cannot have a compelling interest in preventing it from 
discriminating because doing so will not increase the number 
of foster agencies willing to work with same-sex couples: 
either the City allows CSS to continue discriminating, in which 
case there are 29 agencies willing to work with those 
applicants, or it ceases operation altogether, in which case there 
will still be 29 agencies willing to work with those applicants. 
These arguments miss the mark entirely.  The 
government’s interest lies not in maximizing the number of 
establishments that do not discriminate against a protected 
class, but in minimizing—to zero—the number of 
establishments that do.  And that interest is by no means limited 
to public accommodations as defined by the Fair Practices 
Ordinance.  Thus, even if we were to assume that evaluating 
potential foster parents is not a public accommodation, the City 
would still have a compelling interest in adding a non-
discrimination provision to future contracts.   
Nor is the harm the City seeks to prevent speculative.  
Brown held that a law restricting violent video games, on the 
                                              
violations of the ordinance it had long tolerated).  That would 
be a more difficult burden for the City to bear than under the 
RFPA, where the question is simply the weight of the 
government’s interest in enforcing its anti-discrimination laws 
generally. 
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theory that they would make children become more violent, 
could not be sustained, in part due to the lack of sound 
empirical support for this theory.  See 564 U.S. at 800–01.  This 
has no application here, where the mere existence of CSS’s 
discriminatory policy is enough to offend the City’s 
compelling interest in anti-discrimination.  CSS notes that no 
same-sex couples have ever—so far as the record reflects—
approached it seeking to become foster parents.  This is not 
surprising given the Philadelphia Archdiocese’s well-known 
opposition to gay marriage.  But this is beside the point.  The 
harm is not merely that “gay foster parents will be discouraged 
from fostering.”  Appellant’s Br. at 63.  It is the discrimination 
itself. 
So even if CSS could show a substantial burden on its 
religious exercise as defined by the RFPA, the City’s actions 
appear to survive strict scrutiny.  Thus the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that CSS has not 
established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of 
its RFPA claim. 
E. Other Preliminary Injunction Considerations 
We conclude, as the District Court did, that at the 
preliminary injunction stage and on the record before us, CSS 
is not reasonably likely to succeed on the merits of any of its 
claims.  This alone defeats the request for a preliminary 
injunction.  See Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179.  In any event, we also 
agree with the District Court that CSS has not met the other 
factors considered for a preliminary injunction.   
To prevail, CSS must show not only a reasonable 
likelihood of success but also that it is more likely than not to 
suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.  It identified 
several alleged irreparable harms before the District Court, but 
on appeal it wisely focuses on the prospect that, without a 
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contract from the City, it will go out of business.  Arguably 
even this would be compensable through money damages.  Cf. 
Lehigh Valley Cmty. Mental Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 2015 WL 6447171 at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(finding that the threat of going out of business did not qualify 
as an irreparable injury).  In any case, CSS has not met its 
burden of demonstrating that it is more likely than not to suffer 
this injury.  Its congregate care and Community Umbrella 
Agency functions are unaffected, it has other foster care 
contracts with neighboring counties, and even as to its foster 
care services in Philadelphia CSS cites only to Amato’s self-
professed “guess” that it would have to cease those operations 
within months.   
Even if CSS could establish both of the gatekeeping 
factors—likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable 
harm—neither the balance of the equities nor the public 
interest would favor issuing an injunction here.  The District 
Court set out at length the City’s interests in requiring CSS to 
abide by its nondiscrimination policy, see Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d. at 703–04, and we agree that 
the City’s interests weigh substantially in its favor—
particularly in ensuring that government services are open to 
all Philadelphians.  Placing vulnerable children with foster 
families is without question a vital public service, no doubt 
why there are 29 other foster care agencies, including Bethany 
Christian, that provide this service.  Deterring discrimination 
in that effort is a paramount public interest.  
F. Conclusion 
The City stands on firm ground in requiring its 
contractors to abide by its non-discrimination policies when 
administering public services.  Under Smith, the First 
Amendment does not prohibit government regulation of 
religiously motivated conduct so long as that regulation is not 
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a veiled attempt to suppress disfavored religious beliefs.  And 
while CSS may assert that the City’s actions were not driven 
by a sincere commitment to equality but rather by antireligious 
and anti-Catholic bias (and is of course able to introduce 
additional evidence as this case proceeds), the current record 
does not show religious persecution or bias.  Instead it shows 
so far the City’s good faith in its effort to enforce its laws 
against discrimination. 
Hence we hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for preliminary injunctive 
relief and affirm its thorough and well-reasoned decision. 
 
